



## Review Article

# Typology and Performance: In Anthropology and Folklore

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## History of “folkloric behavior” in the folklore Dept.

For the first time in the discipline of Folklore, a professor of psychology agreed to be a member of El-Shamy’s Dissertation: “folkloric Behavior”. The dissertation which transformed folklore into a social science as well as a literary field. It provides the theoretical and applied bases for “Folkloric Behavior,” a term used now worldwide, though without attribution to El-Shamy, its originator.

It addresses views in anthropology and social psychology, such as attitude (sentiments versus emotion), role in the learning concepts and processes “Cognitive learning,” “Memory,” “Vicarious learning (Empathy/Sympathy, identification),” “Copying,” “Motivation,” “Cognitive dissonance,” “Ego involvement,” “Behavior Potential/[or Quantification],” “nationalism,” and “Emotional components” in learning, etc. See “Emotionskomponente/[Emotional Components].” In: *Enzyklopädie des Märchens* (Göttingen) Vol. 3, nos. 4-5 (1981), pp. 1391-395.

Also, for the first time, a psychology department offered a folklore course. Indiana offered folklore as a “Research tool” in lieu of the required foreign language (abt 1972). Regrettably, the chairman of the Folklore Dept. assumed teaching that course his way of literature and history That course enrolled about 26-

28 graduate psychology majors (according to Dorson). Finding nothing of what they expected of “folkloric Behavior,” the course was canceled; (El-Shamy was never contacted to teach it). His published work (e.g., 1999, 2016. Also see, 2004, *Types of the Folktale in the Arab World: A Demographically Oriented Tale-Type Index*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, ), etc.) is secondarily termed “behavioral, cognitive, demographic, etc.”. [For the use of the symbol “\$” (1a&b)] [1].

## Introduction

“Folklore” can be defined as a class of learned, traditional responses forming a distinct type of behavior. The individual must undergo the psychological process of learning to acquire the responses of folkloric behavior, and this learning process occurs under conditions determined by social and cultural factors. The fundamental factors involved in learning are: drive, cue, response, and reward. Secondary factors such as repetition, recency, and ego-involvement can contribute, but their presence is not required in the process of learning. Folkloric behavior is distinguishable from non-traditional, non-folkloric behavior, and consequently, folkloric responses are distinguishable from other classes of responses, such as those characteristics of modern science and technology. Thus, folklorists should initially concern themselves with folkloric responses (narrating, believing, singing, applying a proverb, or dancing) and relevant social and cultural factors before



proceeding to the study of the folklore items themselves (narratives, beliefs, songs, proverbs, or dances).

Through the application of psychological theories of individual and social learning to folkloric phenomena, we can gain an understanding of the forces affecting the perpetuation or extinction of folklore and thus can explain the function of a particular folkloric response in a particular community.

## History of psychological theory in folklore scholarship and anthropology

### Theories of Analytical Psychology and Folklore

Sigmund Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) introduced theories concerning the subconscious and cultural phenomena which have had a profound influence on the modern fields of folklore scholarship and anthropology. In their comprehensive survey of various psychological theories employed by anthropologists, George and Louise Spindler indicate that the psychoanalytic and the new psychoanalytic (Jung, Kardiner, Linton, Fromm, Erikson) interpretations have dominated psychologically oriented anthropology [2]. Similarly, folklorists, in comparable surveys of the various folklore theories, only give accounts of psychoanalytic studies. Such folklorists as Friedrich von der Leyen and Max Lüthi have expressed this opinion, and Richard M. Dorson suggests that the psychoanalytical folklore theory is the only representative of the psychological approach in "Current Folklore Theories [3]."

Anthropologist Thomas Gladwin notes that the influence of psychoanalysts and neopsychoanalytical anthropologists, such as Ralph Linton and Abram Kardiner, "... was so great that since their time the main stream of research and theoretical development in culture and personality has virtually taken for granted the assumption that its primary data are to be found in the realm of emotion [4]." Under psychological mechanism ... the individual is both the subject and the unit for analysis. Such issues in culture and cultural behavior as "origin," "diffusion," "change," and "stability" are analyzed and "explained in terms" of individuals, the conscious and subconscious, and other elements of their personalities.

The psychoanalytical theory of folklore, emerging in the twentieth century under the influence of Freudian theory, is not markedly different from the naive theories popular in the second half of the nineteenth century. The first psychoanalytical treatments of myths and folktales merely substituted sexual symbolism for the solar symbolism that had prevailed earlier. Furthermore, the substitution of symbols did not influence the traditional methodology and techniques employed in the new approach to folklore scholarship. A direct, historical connection is apparent between the German celestial mythologists and the Austrian school of psychoanalytic folklorists, as Dorson notes:

- The Viennese psychoanalytical school could scarcely have avoided familiarity with the German nature mythologists, and the extent of their reading is seen in Otto Rank's study of *The Myth of the Birth of the*

*Hero*. Rank cites a shelfful of writings by the older school, disparaging them but adopting their method of interpretation. Only the symbols change ... Just as the celestial mythologists wrangled over the primacy of the sun, storms, and stars, so now do the psychoanalytical mythologists dispute over the symbols from the unconscious. Formerly it was Müller, Kuhn, Preller, Goldziher, and Frobenius, who recriminated; now it is Freud, Jung, Ferenczi, Fromm, Kerényi, Róheim, and Reik [5].

Scholars contributing to psychoanalytic studies have proven prolific, yielding an abundance of theories and explications to folkloric and anthropological phenomena [6]. In 1913, Carl G. Jung severed his intellectual ties with Freud and established his own school of analytical psychology [7]. However, his school did not develop innovations in the psychoanalytic treatment of cultural material, nor radically alter the concept of symbolism which remained the basis of the psychoanalytic approach. The differences between the two schools were limited to questions of the origin of the symbol and its significance for the behavior and cultural values of an ethnic group. Similarly, the new psychoanalytic school was to cling to the essentials of the psychoanalytical approach as formulated by Freud [8]. According to Freud, the symbol in dreams and myths is a product of the individual's unconscious; Jung and his followers believe that the symbol in myths is a product of the collective unconscious. This symbolic significance of motifs and themes - with definite reference to "the unconscious mind of the individual," or the "collective unconscious" of the ethnic group -- has been criticized methodologically and conceptually on the one hand and theoretically and ontologically on the other.

**First:** Blindness to the social and cultural forces peculiar to certain cultures has been the main methodological criticism leveled against the psychoanalytical school by anthropologists and folklorists. L. Bryce Boyer, 'Investigator ... in Anthropo-Psychoanalytic Techniques,' states:

- During the period when their knowledge was dominated by the topographic viewpoint, psychoanalysts studied myths, frequently without knowledge of cultures within which the myth had been produced. Using their newly acquired knowledge concerning unconscious mechanisms and especially symbolism, they sought simultaneously to interpret myths from their manifested contents and to use the interpretations to support psychoanalytic concepts particularly those related to infantile sexual wishes. Social scientists of varying persuasions object to such manipulation of data [9].

Social and cultural scientists have become sharply aware of the determining effects of the structure and value of regional, social, and cultural forces on the personalities of individual members of the society. Clyde Kluckhohn criticized early psychoanalysts for imposing universal "pan-humanic" symbols, supposedly having the same meaning and organic psychological significance for all cultures [10]. John Whiting defined "personality" as an "intervening hypothetical



variable determined by child rearing, which is determined by maintenance system and which is finally reflected in projective systems” [11]-- a concept foreign to early psychoanalytically oriented schools of anthropology and of folklore, which largely ignored the role of social and cultural forces involved in the formation of personality.

In contemporary anthropology, social structure has been stressed as a determining influence upon the socialization process, which in turn affects the expressive cultural phenomena. For example, Malinowski indicated that the object of childhood resentment among the Trobriand Islanders is the matrilineal uncle (the boy’s sociological father) and not the biological father [12]. This “ambivalent attitude” of the boy towards his mother’s brother rather than towards his father refutes the assertion of the psychoanalytical school of a universal innate father-son Oedipal complex. Furthermore, William Lessa pointed out the incongruous fact that the oedipal motif and tales appear in cultures lacking the conditions necessary for the Oedipus-complex situation, and do not appear in Africa, most of Asia, the two Americas, or Australia [13]. Similarly, Melville J. Herskovits examined the Oedipus complex concerning the family structure and cultural traits of non-Western cultures and noted other factors, such as rivalry for the mother’s favor and lack of acute awareness of the father’s presence [14], which Freud had overlooked. Thus, the all-embracing psychoanalytical theories have generally proved of little value for the study of culture. Weston La Barre has found that the writing by several psychoanalysts on cultural issues has been based on the outmoded theory of cultural evolutionism, and he attacks Jung’s concept of the “*Universalgedanke*,” or “archetype” (a core of psychological attitudes common to all men which override social and cultural influences) because it contradicts ethnological data [15].

**Second:** The psychoanalytical approach to the study of culture has been attacked on theoretical grounds. The problem is a philosophical one, considering the ontological aspects of culture regarding allied “levels” of human activities, such as the psychological, social, and cultural. In 1911, Franz Boas observed that the explanation of cultural phenomena in terms of innate biological differences leads to the assumption that

- The whole problem of the development of culture is ... reduced to the study of psychological and social conditions which are common to mankind as a whole and to the effects of historical happenings and of natural and cultural environment [16].

Boas’ criticism of the psychological treatment of culture as a reduction of a cultural phenomenon to a psycho-logical level was persuasively expressed by Alfred Kroeber, whose theory of the “superorganic” explained cultural phenomena without reducing culture to the plane of purely psychic activities and products. In 1917 Kroeber wrote:

- The reason why mental heredity has nothing to do with civilization, is that civilization is not mental action but a body or stream of products of mental exercise ... Mentality relates to the individual. The social or cultural

on the other hand, is in its very essence non-individual [17].

He denied that the three levels of human existence-- the individual, the social, and the cultural--were linked together: “As against Spencer and other sociologists, Kroeber maintains the complete disparity of biological and cultural evolution [18].” Thus he concluded, “The dawn of the social ... is not a link in any chain, not a step in a path, but a leap to another plane [19].” Thus David Bidney states: “... Kroeber came to regard the abstract mental products of society, which he called culture or civilizations reality *sui generis*, subject to autonomous historical process of development which were independent of psychological experiences and actual social behavior [20]. Kroeber’s theory of the superorganic has had a tremendous impact on American anthropology. Bidney reports that “Kroeber’s paper on ‘The Superorganic’ has since become a classic in American anthropological literature, and his term ‘superorganic’ ... has achieved recognition among American scholars” [21].

Culture, being “the superpsychic product of special mental process,” [22] would not accept psychology as a tool for investigating its phenomena and measuring its dimensions. As the Spindlers point out, the “Equation of the individual [and culture] with psychological process leaves the problem at an idiosyncratic, unpredictable, unique level” [23]. This idiosyncrasy led to the “... rejection of psychologizing by some anthropologists: they see such a focus as a form of reduction (from the cultural level) that is likely to lead nowhere” [24]. In other words, explaining such cultural phenomena as the mythology of a nation or ethnic group, in psychoanalytical terms of the “ego” and the “subconscious” would be as meaningless as measuring weights in feet and inches and distance in pounds and ounces.

Thus, since its beginnings [sixty-five years earlier], the psychoanalytic approach to folklore theory has suffered a great deal of criticism. Today, most folklorists dismiss pure theory unsubstantiated by field material and functional evidence and consider the psychoanalytical approach “the most speculative body of current folklore theory” [25]. Their opposition to the “speculative” aspect of psychoanalytical treatment ranges from the cautious, qualified approval of empirical anthropologists such as Herskovits, Lessa, and Jacobs, to the complete rejection by conservative folklorists like Alexander H. Krappe, who quoted Karl Abraham solely “for the entertainment of the reader,” and considers his work “trash” [26]. Stith Thompson dismissed the work of psychologists as “unreal” in 1946, [27] and, more emphatically in 1955, described psychological symbolists as inconsistent, “fantastic,” and “absurd.” [28] Claude Lévi-Strauss blamed the unfortunate influence of psychoanalytic theories for the fact that the study of myth has remained in a chaotic state despite fifty years of scholarship [29].

In light of these hostile views, the psychoanalytic approach to the study of folkloric phenomena, particularly in its social and cultural context, merits little consideration. A new psychological theory that can account for various folkloric phenomena in empirical, behavioristic terms is necessary.



## Psychological theories of learning and culture

The idea that culture is “acquired” was introduced by Edward B. Tylor in 1871 in the opening statement of *Primitive Culture* [30]. This tenet was first supported by such anthropologists as Clark Wissler, Ruth Benedict, and Ralph Linton, in opposition to the previously accepted theory, espoused by Lamarck, Darwin, and Spencer, which attributed cultural phenomena to biologically determined conditions. In our own time, Herskovits reports that “The clearest definition of culture in psychological terms states: *culture is the learned portion of human behavior* [31]. Similarly, Bidney asserts “There is ... general agreement among social scientists that culture is historically acquired by man as a member of society and that it is communicated largely by language or symbolic forms and through participation in social institutions [32]. Herskovits stresses the learning process as the factor that keeps culture alive” ... it is recognized by all students that whatever forms susceptible of objective description may compose a culture, they must be learned by succeeding generations of a population if they are not to be lost [33]. The concept that culture is acquired through learning has undergone constant modification and clarification since its introduction to the field of ethnology. Under the influence of learning theories, the idea that culture is acquired gained a sharply empirical dimension. Their impact on the study of culture led to insistence on empiricism in defining cultural phenomena and to the denial of superorganicism. Consequently, E.A. Hoebel suggests that the rejection by anthropologists of Kroeber’s classical superorganic theory was “... a legacy of behaviorism in psychology [34].”

The empirical approach to the study of cultural phenomena has resulted in the use of the term “culture” to denote basic empirical principles: culture is a learned [35] behavior [36] that is necessary for problem-solving and adjustment [37] in a society.

Experimental psychology inevitably had an impact upon cultural studies because culture was defined as an abstract logical construct, rather than an actual, behavioristic entity. The Spindlers suggest that “If stimulus-response reinforcement theory, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, and aspects of cognitive theory can be lumped together as broadly representing what can be called “learning theory,” this field of psychology runs a close second to the psychoanalytic and new psychoanalytic category in the extent of influence upon anthropology.” [38] Concepts and terminology from learning psychology have penetrated the active, concept-impregnated vocabulary of many anthropologists to such a degree that they are used freely without specific citation much more frequently than with it” [39]. The influence of learning theory (particularly Clark Hull’s theory “which has had a considerable vogue in anthropology” [40]) reached a high point during “The Anthropological First Step Toward a Psychocultural Approach” between 1936 and 1948. A few of the psychological attempts to develop a framework to analyze cultural stability and change employed learning theory. For example, G.P. Murdock argued that “*culture is learned*,” “inculcated,” (“... [taught] or [instilled] by frequent repetitions or admonitions”), “*gratifying*,” and

“*adaptive*” [41] -- all of these concepts are directly affiliated with learning theory. Similarly, John Gillin equates cultural custom to psychological habit and discusses the extinction of old customs (habits) when their practitioner is punished. He utilizes the “primary’ and “secondary’ drive theory and cites Hull, O. Hobart Mowrer Neal E. Miller, and John Dollard [42]. Gregory Bateson, cited by Margaret Mead as an anthropologist influenced by the learning theory [43], distinguished between those cultures in which learning occurs through the experience of reward or punishment, and those in which learning occurs by instrumental avoidance and is never extinguished because it is never overtly practiced in social life [44].

The influence of learning theory in anthropology reached a climax in Malinowski’s later works. In *A Scientific Theory of Culture* [45] he referred to the stimulus-response learning theory in the Hullian tradition to account for the origin of cultural and social institutions. Studies of cultural diffusion began to emphasize the role of the individual as a culture carrier - a factor that had previously been ignored. A. Irving Hallowell states that individuals are never passive culture bearers; abstract “cultures” never meet, only individuals meet. His concept of cultural diffusion was built on psychological factors in learning such as motivations in contact situations, stimuli and responses, anxiety reduction, and rewards and punishments. All these factors first appeared in Miller and Dollard’s *Social Learning and Imitation*, which served as the theoretical basis for Hallowell’s work [46]. However, the new approach represented in such pioneering studies did not radically alter the existing state of culture studies, The Spindlers summarized the situation:

- During the latter phase (the mid-forties) of the period during which these constructs and their applications were emerging, the more broad personality and culture group was gaining strength ... Although the influence of behaviorism and, to some extent, Gestalt psychology was represented in these writings, the influence of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychiatry was decidedly dominant [47].

Thus defined, “culture” recognizes the individual’s role in cultural processes. Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, emphasizing the psychological nature of this role, state:

- Human behavior ... which is widely felt to characterize man as a rational being, or as a particular nation or social class is acquired rather than innate. To understand thoroughly any item of human behavior - either in the social group or in the individual life - one must know the psychological principles involved in its learning and the social conditions under which this learning took place [48].

These concepts had their greatest impact in the forties and early fifties. In search for relations between “Culture and Logical Process,” Gladwin notes that although the “... theory of learning formulated by Clark Hull has had considerable vogue in anthropology, ... this theory is far more concerned with motivation and reward for learning than it is with the



cognitive integrations accomplished in learning [49], and, by 1964, the general attitude was that “Aside from the Hullan theory, attention to the process of learning and thinking, and the nature of intelligence, has been minimal in anthropology” [50] The utilization of psychological concepts in anthropology declined considerably during the fifties and early sixties: “Ten years ago there was a considerable flow of ideas and applications for the most part from psychology to anthropology ... But somehow fatigue has set in. Anthropologists have wearied of complicating further their already complicated professional lives.” [51] Between 1929 and 1952 seventy-three percent of the articles on culture change published in the *American Anthropologist* were psychologically oriented; whereas in the same journal between 1952 and 1962, only thirty-four percent of that literature showed psychological influence [52]. The difference between the two periods proves to be phenomenal.

The search for explanations of cultural phenomena and the similarities to be found in different cultures has led anthropologists to accept theories that apply to mankind in general and transcend the particular characteristics of individual societies. Thus, “It is no accident that the kinds of psychology contributing most to anthropology and receiving the most from it were primarily psychoanalytically oriented psychoanalytic models [which] were most analogous to anthropological models [53].” It was also no accident that learning psychology, “a close second” to psychoanalytical psychology, has only contributed what anthropologists were willing to accept. The Hullan and related learning theories have had only partial success in defining and explaining the characteristics and mechanisms of cultural learning, transmission, and change. Gladwin noted the irony that “... anthropology, with its primary emphasis on the regularities of behavior as they are transmitted through culture from one generation to the next, is the one [field of inquiry into human behavior] which most consistently ignores the cognitive learning involved in this cultural transmission [54].”

### Folklore and the superorganic process

Before examining early principles of learning and memory which found expression in folklore scholarship should be made of other efforts to account for the independent origin, and stability of folklore--apart from the individual, and point out some differences between these two trends in the study of folklore.

In 1908, Axel Olrik presented his “epic laws of folk-poetry, [55]” to the Historians’ Congress in Berlin, postulating structural laws to determine the conditions and aspects of the “*Sagenwelt*” (akin to Herskovits’ “oral literature” and Bascom’s “verbal art;” see *post*, page 82, n. Error! Bookmark not defined). According to these laws, the *Sagenwelt* is completely autonomous of psychological and social forces. Alan Dundes, in his introductory statement to the English translation of Olrik’s work [56], has legitimately equated “Olrik’s conception of these laws ... [as] analogous to what anthropologists term as superorganic conception of culture.” Thus, “The folk narrator, according to this view, can only blindly obey the epic laws. The superorganic laws are above any individual’s control.” Dundes concluded: “This kind of thin king ... takes the folk

out of folklore;” [57] thus reducing folklore scholarship to the study of lifeless texts which exist independently of the individual. Folklorists have found fault with Olrik’s theory on grounds other than its disregard for the human agent. Van Gennep, for example, felt that the theory had no realistic basis, its laws having been arbitrarily devised: “The supposed epic laws of Axel Olrik: these are formal techniques, [a] machinery arbitrarily isolated” [58].

In 1930, André Jolles presented his theory of the “simple forms,” which not only “took the folk out of folklore,” but also claimed autonomy of origin, function, form, and existence for folklore genres through language. As Jolles saw it, “The entire work, which fulfills itself in peasants, hand-workers, and priests, fulfills itself in language once more” [59]. Once this product of [average workers, craftsmen, and professionals] entered the language, it is re-created by language, language re-creating what life had produced. Jolles described the process:

- Everything which peasants, craftsmen, priests thus far accomplished in terms of work belongs to living, dissolves with living, revitalizes itself in living, or has permanency only within life. But through the work of language, it [i.e., everything] achieves a new permanency through language itself. In two ways: Firstly everything (that is) engendered, created, (and) explained is given a name through language. But secondly--and here we probe more deeply--is[n’t] language itself something which engenders, creates, explains[;] something within which ordering, reordering, and delegating [may self-combine] creatively [60].

For Jolles, the “simple forms” (religious legend, legend, myth, riddle, saying, ‘case,’ memorate, fairy-tale, and joke) are formed not by the human agent but by language, which extracts events from life and re-creates them as independent entities. Thus folklore - through language - becomes an autonomous, abstract, cultural process, *sui generis*, requiring no reference to social or psychological conditions for an explanation of its origin, development, or existence.

Dundes did not observe that superorganicism, through language, is the dominant factor behind Jolles’ concept of the “simple forms.” Unfortunately, he includes Anderson’s “law of self-correction” as another case of superorganic law,” [61] without realizing that in Anderson’s “the law of self-correction” [62] narratives correct themselves through the folk. However, this characteristic of Anderson’s law, that is: being psychological or organic rather than superorganic, was not recognized in any of the writings by folklorists dealing with this problem. Anderson himself did not specify the psychological nature of his own theory until 1956 when Kurt Schier attacked his 1947 “Ein Volkskundliches Experiment” [63] presented as a defense of his 1923 work, “The Law of Self-correction.” Schier charged that in Anderson’s work “The method is psychological, not folkloristic.” Anderson readily justified the psychological nature of his approach vis-a-vis folklore research: “Obviously ... [the method] is psychological: it is a psychological study dealing with a folklore object” [64].



## Concepts of memory and learning theory in folklore scholarship

Gladwin commented on the ironic disregard anthropology has shown for cognitive learning theory. Folklore research, while emphasizing the regularities of traditional behavior as they are transmitted from one generation to the next, and the relative stability of folklore genres, “transmissible at a distance in time or space” [65] through oral transmission, has made only minimal use of learning theory. The irony is greater when we recall that in the first quarter of this century leading folklorists treated issues central to learning psychology. Learning, forgetting, and remembering (see n. 281) were recognized and examined by leading folklorists; yet this aspect of their work exerted practically no influence on the field. The influences of Freud, and that of Bartlett-Anderson, for example, on folklore scholarship are not comparable. As already pointed out, the psychoanalytic school has played a major role in the study of folklore, whereas learning theory, though influential in anthropology, never played a significant role.

- Folklore material is expressed in genres and forms possessing elements of autonomous existence, as has been stated by cultural scientists and carried to an extreme by the superorganicists. These genres and forms—already available in a society—constitute one of the three basic elements involved in the transmission of culture: “the capacity to learn,” “the capacity to teach,” and “the capacity to embody knowledge in forms ...” [65a]. In addition to general classificatory significance, Jan Vansina, examining oral traditions, especially “formulas” such as “slogans,” “didactic formulas,” and ritual formulas, poetry, “tales,” such as myths, legends, and memorates, stresses “fixity of form” and “typology” for each genre and the influence of form and structure on the process of transmission [65b].

### Antti aarne

The Grimm brothers interpreted the similarities in tales told by different peoples as proof of an original Indo-European common source [66]. Antti Aarne responded to this explanation,

“If this concurrence had developed in this manner, it would not have extended beyond the main ideas or the main traits of the narrative.” These congruencies are so remarkable that “One now often recognizes similarities even in the least significant side-circumstances, and the composition of long, complicated narratives is the same in many countries.” [67]. Thus, Aarne thought that questions of stability and change were answered in “the inner life of the *Märchen*,” leading him to conclude that “the changes follow certain laws of thinking and imagination” [68]. Aarne proceeded to formulate laws of change according to these “definite laws of thinking and imagination (fantasy).” However, he dealt only with the “changes in the *Märchen*” [69]. which constituted only “forgetting” and “alterations” [70]. leaving the laws of “learning” and subsequent “stability” unexplained.

The “laws” of change were introduced to field workers later in a different form. Vansina perceived two basic “types”

of change, rather than “laws” – change in oral tradition “... due to transmission ... and failure of memory,” [71] and a functional change, in which “... alterations are made so that the tradition should fulfill its social function,” these alterations being “usually unintentional.” However, in addition to these two, the “... private purpose of the informant [might] lead to falsification” [72].

There had been, of course, earlier efforts to account for the stability of folklore in terms of structure and inner factors peculiar to the genres or forms concerned (Jolles’ principle of “simple forms” and Olrik’s “epic laws of folk-poetry”). However, it was Walter Anderson, a decade after Aarne had introduced his laws of change, who made the first serious attempt to formulate laws of stability in terms recognizable as psychological principles of learning, or Aarne’s “laws of thinking and imagination.”

### FC Bartlett

In 1920, shortly after Aarne had introduced his laws of change, Frederick C. Bartlett [73], conducted an experiment on remembering, using folklore material to test the effect of “Repeated Reproduction by the Same Individual,” and “Serial Reproduction” on a “... story [74] ... [which] belonged to a level of culture and a social environment exceedingly different from those of ... [the] subjects.” [75] Himself a psychologist, Bartlett stated that “One possible line of approach to the study of these problems ... [was] by way of psychological experiment to point out ‘social factors in recall,’” a treatment that is usually classified as dealing with “Perception, Memory, and Motivation” [76].

Bartlett noted in his introductory statement that “When a story is passed on from one person to another, each man repeating as he imagines, what he has heard from the last narrator, it undergoes many successive changes before it at length arrives at that relatively fixed form in which it may become current throughout the whole community [77]. Thus he was dealing with two distinct problems: the mechanism of transmitting material from one person to another, and the effect of cultural and social values on the mechanism. Unlike the followers of the psychoanalytical approach fashionable at that time, Bartlett did not attribute the origin of folktales to the symbolic representation of psychic phenomena; instead, he felt that these origins, involved the perception of certain cultural and social phenomena, memory for meaningful details, and motivation for certain goals. Moreover, he did not theorize or hypothesize, but rather experimented “... to discover the principles according to which successive versions in such a process of change may be traced” [78].

Bartlett’s major concern was discovering the social and cultural factors that exerted change and instability on the folktale. He took it for granted that changes would take place and was interested in the sociocultural aspects of these changes. However, we can infer a second conclusion from the context of his experiment. In his study on *Memory*, Ian M.L. Hunter casually remarked that in both series in Bartlett’s experiment, the story was drastically shortened because ... few adults could,



at a single hearing, memorize the original word for word” [79]. Thus, the lack of repetition caused instability in the text in both cases of “Repeated Reproduction by the Same Individual,” and “Serial Reproduction.”

### Walter Anderson and Albert Wesselski

In concluding his monumental work, *Kaiser und Abt* (1923), Anderson offered some “general remarks” resulting from his study. The first observation was “The Law of Self-correction of Folk-narratives,” [80] intended to explain J. Bédier’s remarks on the changes occurring in a folklore item as it is expressed in various cultures [81]. In a footnote Anderson stated that the “law of self-correction” is not limited to narrative genres of folklore but it.

“...more or less refers also to the other creations of oral traditions: songs, riddles, proverbs, etc” [82].

Anderson was responding to the phenomenon that, “... long and complicated narratives live through many centuries and spread from mouth to mouth almost all over the globe, without suffering on their way any major changes.” The law which he formulated sought to establish “how could this unbelievable stability be explained ...” [83]. To account for this stability, Anderson introduced two psychological factors. The first, explicitly formulated, was the “law of frequency,” “law of exercise” or “repetition” a concept expressed in the Latin proverb “Repetitio est mater studiorum {[Repetition is the mother of learning]}” [84]. The second was the concept that *cues* elicit and guide responses to drives [85]. Anderson’s inclination toward some principles of learning psychology had little effect on the orientations of other folklorists, just as Bartlett’s experiment had failed to draw the attention of psychologists to the field of folklore [86].

Eight years after Anderson’s theory of the stability of folktales appeared, Albert Wesselski presented a rebuttal in the form of a demonstration, or empirical, experiment [87] which was the first non-psychological experiment. Wesselski attributed the idea for his experiment to Friedrich Schlegel’s comment that folksongs were produced through the process of failure of transmission; for it is where there are folksongs to be collected, they would facilitate the generating of more of the same in any amount one would like [88].

- It should be pointed out, however, that Wesselski introduced Schlegel’s suggestion as a forerunner to the concept of deterioration theory for it was introduced “lange, bevor das Wort zersingen zum ersten Male gebraucht worden ist {long before the word ‘deteriorate through singing/speaking’ was used for the first time}” [88].

Schlegel suggested that this degenerative process could be verified through a demonstration experiment and provided the outline of this demonstration experiment as well as the results which he forecasted as inevitable. Schlegel envisaged the demonstration experiment as follows:

- One would take any poem by Gellert or Hagendorn {[famous literary men]} and have a four or five-year-

old child memorize it; certainly, there will be no lack of romantic confusion and truncations, and one may repeat the procedure [only] three or four times, and to one’s own amazement, one will find an excellent folksong fitting to the newest taste instead of the honest, old poem of the golden age [89].

Following this pattern, Wesselski set up a demonstration experiment (with the approval and help of Dr. Gustav Jungbauer, “Advocate of German *Volkskunde* at Prague’s German University”) to establish “... with older children, who all have read their *Märchen*, what of it remains in their memory, how far an effect this memory and the understanding of the *Märchen* have in the narrating of it” [90]. Wesselski was certain that the results would coincide with Schlegel’s predictions and defined the purpose as the establishment of “... to what degree *Märchen* disintegrate with these [children]” [91]. This “disintegration” was anticipated in spite of the fact that these older children “... [who]—except for the people who occupy themselves with this professionally—must have or have had the most interest in [*Märchen*]” [92]. For that purpose, “Dornröschen,” (Type AT 410, *Sleeping Beauty*) was selected for the experiment and told to a class of thirty-eight students between twelve and thirteen years of age. Of these students, five were disqualified because they were “uninterested.” The result was that “of the remaining thirty-three presentations of the *Märchen*, only eighteen narrated all of its main parts” [93]. The renditions of the tale recited by the girls showed numerous and varied changes. Moreover, the influences from the Grimm and Bechstein literary versions were remarkable.

Wesselski concluded that “... the *Märchen*, even if it has not only been heard, but also been received in printed and illustrated form if it is available at any hour [in such printed form], often disintegrates when it is retold, even for the first time” [94]. Wesselski predicted the future of both the tale and his subjects as narrators, pointing out that even in the hands of these “small girls in Komotau,” who still “..., remembered parts better than some other [girls did] when reading and hearing the *Märchen*” [95], the tale would suffer more in the future “...should they tell it to their little daughter ... then their little daughter [as] teenager, and then again [the teenagers] as mothers, and so forth” [96].

Wesselski refused as “something that perhaps could be thought of [at most] as an exception” [97]. Anderson’s explanation of folktale stability (“... each narrator [must] have heard the *Märchen* [or anecdote, religious legend, etc] under consideration from his predecessor usually not once but several times”) [98]. For Wesselski, tale-telling is a maimed creature which must depend upon the “crutch [in form] of books” [99]. if any stability is to be gained in its constant state of flux, and oral repetition—as postulated by Anderson—does not contribute to this stability because, simply, it does not occur.

Sixteen years later Anderson refuted Wesselski’s conceptual attacks and avoided Bartlett’s methodological “fundamental errors,” with a second demonstration experiment designed to establish “...what results when a *Märchen* or legend passes about a dozen times from mouth to mouth according to the



one-source-principle” [100]. This demonstration experiment was conducted between June 16 and July 22, 1947 [101], and involved thirty-six students, from the University of Kiel, divided into three “tradition-chains.” The experiment was not published until 1951, a gap of twenty years elapsing between Wesselski’s experiment and Anderson’s [101].

The Dorpat experiment and the conditions under which it was conducted are little known because the research manuscript has been lost. Anderson gives the following brief resumé of the experiment: “In den zwanziger Jahren dieser Jahrhunderts habe ich das Bartlettsche Experiment an der Universität Dorpat wiederholt, und zwar liess ich nach und nach etwa 8 parallele Traditionsketten von je 10 Gliedern bilden.” When compared to Bartlett’s experiment, „... die Resultate waren denjenigen Bartlett’s vollkommen analog {“In the twentieth year [of] this Century, I have repeated Bartlett’s Experiment at Dorpat University and indeed little by little, more or less let about 8 parallel tradition chains formed. When compared to Bartlett’s experiment the results were fully compatible, free tr.}”. Anderson, “Ein Volkskundliches Experiment,” (see p. 5).

The results of this demonstration experiment and those of an earlier experiment conducted in Dorpat [102] prove to be “the same” [103]. Both experiments substantiated Anderson’s original theoretical contentions, that “if it was so, then the memory failure and the personal fantasy of the narrators would constantly bring changes to the text, which would cumulate and in the shortest amount of time would disfigure the text so that it couldn’t be recognized anymore” [104].

- The only information about this experiment was given briefly by Anderson in 1956. He reported that “Im Jahre 1953 wiederholte Prof. Dr. Gyula Ortutay an der Universität Budapest aus eigenem Antrieb mein Kieler Experiment, und zwar unter genau denselben Bedingungen und mit derselben pommerschen Teufelssage als Grundlage ... Wiederum ergab sich genau dasselbe Resultat.” Anderson, “Eine Neue Arbeit,” [105].

The six demonstration experiments are known to have been conducted in this field--Bartlett’s Cambridge experiment in 1920; Anderson’s Dorpat experiment in the twenties; Wesselski’s Komotau experiment in 1931; Anderson’s second Kiel experiment in 1947 (published in 1951); Gyula Ortutay’s Budapest experiment in 1953; [105] and Kurt Schier’s Gauting experiment in 1955 [106], have all led to the same conclusion: lack of repetition results in failure to reproduce the material correctly and the ensuing distortion is produced by idiosyncratic and cultural differences characteristic of the individual subjects.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Bartlett’s experiment, as conducted by Anderson, virtually served as a model for all of the experiments that followed. Although Wesselski’s experiment was proposed and executed independently, it was strikingly similar to the Bartlett-Anderson model in its procedures and goal. It will be remembered that Anderson was interested in *positive* aspects, such as learning and stability, in his “law of self-correction.” Under Bartlett’s influence,

he turned to negative aspects of the folklore process, such as forgetting and change, without ever trying to prove his original assertion that stability in folk narrative relies on repetition.

- This is an unpublished doctoral dissertation. A critical resumé is given by Walter Anderson, who describes Schier’s goals: “Im 1955 beschloss ... Kurt Schier gleichfalls meinen Kieler Versuch zu wiederholen, aber unter abgeänderten Bedingungen,” and quotes Schier’s statement concerning the objectives of his work to be “um treffendere Ergebnisse gewinnen zu können, als es Anderson getan hatte.” [106].

Except for the Bartlett-Anderson approach, which itself has had only a very weak and sporadic impact on folklore scholarship over the past fifty years, learning psychology has largely been ignored in folklore studies. This situation persists in spite of attempts by leading folklorists to establish laws for stability and change in folklore. Although concepts and terms of learning theory have been unwittingly adopted by folklorists, no learning theory has yet been applied in a field that is primarily concerned with traditional behavior.

An example is Ortutay’s “Principles of Oral Transmission in Folk Culture [107],” in which the author discusses “acceptance by the public,” “repudiation,” and “refusal,” [108] without reference to the law of effect in learning theory. He also discusses “modeling,” [109] following Hans Naumann’s concept of imitation of a superior social class, but does not refer to the theory of “imitation,” and introduces the concept of “affinity” and the “law of attraction” [110] without reference to the theory of contiguity and association as explained by Guthrie and Watson or to Thorndike’s sublaws of “polarity,” and “belongingness.”

Implicit references to learning concepts, particularly the concept of reward, appear in Cecil Sharp’s comments on the “evolution” of the folksong [111] (often quoted by Ortutay), C.W. Von Sydow’s *Selected Papers on Folklore* [112], (Copenhagen, 1945) Wolfram Eberhard’s *Minstrel Tales from Southeastern Turkey* [113], Linda Dégh’s “Some Questions of the Social Function of Story-telling,” [114] and *Märchen, Erzähler und Erzählgemeinschaft* [115], (Berlin, 1962) and Albert Lord’s *The Singer of Tales* [116]. Similarly, functionalism is based on the Hullian learning theory, with particular stress on the concept of reward or satisfaction, the formula for functionalism being: Drive-Response-Reward. Unfortunately, both the process of learning and learning mechanisms have been ignored by functionalist folklorists, and anthropologists, who have sought to establish the “function,” (goal or result) of cultural objects and phenomena in a community without referring to the mechanism involved in the process of achieving satisfaction. Other folklorists have used individual learning principles in connection with psychological characteristics. Lauri Honko, for example, in “Memorates [(personal experience narratives)] and the Study of Folk Beliefs,” [117] applied the question of “stimuli” and “perception” to the memorates, local legends, and legends which develop from beliefs through the perceptual mechanisms characteristic of individual members of a community.





The importance of the learning process in folklore is evidenced by its role in the transmission of folklore material from one generation to the next or from one culture to another, transmission constituting one of the most vital aspects of folklore scholarship.

## The complex process of transmission

The basic factor which keeps folklore and all other aspects of culture dynamic within a society is the transmission of culture from person to person, and from one generation to the next. Without transmission, culture would become static, and folklore material would either perish or be relegated to lifeless, written texts. Most folklorists accept transmission as a recognizable process that can be explained through such routine factors [118] as the name and age, and occasionally the social status of the informant and the peripheral circumstances accompanying the item when it was first observed. The transmission process is quite complex, being a composite arising from a series of cultural activities.

- Kenneth S. Goldstein, recognizing this limitation in folklore research, wrote: "The transmission process of folklore is still largely undocumented." He also realized the necessity for such information as "when," "where," "from whom," "how," "how often," and "why," but, unfortunately, he does not go beyond a simple listing of these questions to a study of their operative significance in the process and mechanisms of transmission [118].

Mead writes, "The term *cultural transmission* covers a series of activities, all essential to culture, which it is useful to subdivide into the capacity to learn, the capacity to teach, and the capacity to embody knowledge in forms which make it transmissible at a distance in time and space [119]." Mead's analysis of the components of cultural transmission can be rephrased into three main categories for application to folklore scholarship:

1. **The capacity to formulate:** Folklore scholarship, as a science mainly concerned with traditional aspects of culture, identifies the "forms" that render folkloric knowledge transmissible through both time and pace. The elements of traditionality and continuity are both common denominators in most of the definitions for "folklore" given in *the Standard Dictionary of Folklore Mythology and Legend* [120]. Definitions of particular classes of folkloric material, such as "verbal art" and "oral literature" (see *post*, page 76) also include these two principles as basic characteristics. Åke Hultkranz divided the many definitions of "folklore" into three basic groups: "First, there is the idea that f. [folklore] presents cultural traditions ... Then there is the notion that f. ought to be restricted to folk literature ... land] lastly, f. is understood as the total culture of the folk in contradistinction to the culture of the higher classes." This last concept not only stresses traditionality but also alludes to the concept of survivals (the notion of continuity of material despite the loss of its original function), Hultkranz states that this attitude was "...

easily developed in Europe as a functional broadening of [William] Thoms' definition" [121]. Andrew Lang consequently defined "folklore" as "... the study of survivals [122]." Referring to the continuity of form and content in the folktale, Thompson noted that "... we shall find these forms not so rigid as the theoretician might wish, for they will be blending into each other with amazing facility. Fairy tales become myths, or animal tales, or local legends [123]." Similarly, Dorson points out instances of narrative genres metamorphosing poetic genres [124]. Yet, despite this dynamic quality, folklore remains "remarkably stable" [125].

The existence of folklore material in definite forms and the influence of these forms on the mechanisms of the transmission process may be regarded as two complementary elements of the folklore phenomena. Theorists have sought to establish structural laws for different forms of folklore genres. Olrik postulated "epic laws of folk-poetry" to characterize the structure of the *Sagenwelt* while Jolles perceived certain folklore genres as inevitable linguistic "simple forms," independent of external influences. Rank [126], Vladimir Propp [127], Raglan [128] have also postulated structural patterns for the folktale.

Regarding transmission, Vansina suggests that folklore forms are determined by function and that these forms each determine their own transmission process [129]. Mead outlines the influences exerted by internal elements of form and content, as opposed to those exerted by the external form of society:

- ... the social structure of a society and the way learning is structured - the way it passes from mother to daughter, from father to son, from mother's brother to sister's son, from shaman to novice, from mythological specialist to aspirant specialist - determine far beyond the actual content of the learning both how individuals will learn to think and how the store of learning, the sum total of separate pieces of skill and knowledge which could be obtained by separately interviewing each member of the society, is shared and used [130].

Thus, a joke, a tale, a song, a proverb, or a belief exists in a definable basic form characteristic to its genre. The knowledge of this characteristic form and content must be a part of the individual's perception (covertly comprehended) before he can transmit it to another person. The folkloric knowledge of the characteristic values, forms, and content of these genres must exist as "artifacts," and "mentifacts" or "socifacts" [131] before the individual can learn these folklore items through transmission. After all, we cannot transmit what does not exist, nor what we do not know; to tell a story, one must first know the plot; to sing a song, one must know the words; and to apply a proverb to a situation, one must know its meaning and wording.

- Bidney has proposed the classification of cultural products into three types: "artifacts," "mentifacts," and "socifacts," these cultural facts constituting "the material, formal, and final causes of cultural development" [131].



2. **The capacity to teach:** In the context of folklore, the “capacity to teach” is the capacity to communicate folkloric knowledge in its *traditional forms* to others. However, the verb “to teach” is somewhat ambiguous, especially when applied to culture. Herskovits assigns three basic components to the process of enculturation: “socialization,” “education,” and “schooling.” The latter, “schooling,” refers to “... those processes of teaching and learning carried out at specific times, in particular places outside the home for definite periods by persons especially prepared or trained for the task [132]. “Education,” on the other hand, is a direct learning process and can occur both formally and informally. The elements of teaching and learning are present in all three processes. Nevertheless, teaching understood in the conventional sense to mean instructing to transfer knowledge or skills to a recipient, is not necessarily part of folklore transmission, for intentional teaching is not always a factor in the process of *everyday folkloric activities*. Exceptions are cases of coaching and apprenticeship among professional minstrels and narrators [133], and the performers of rituals and highly institutionalized activities [134].

Whether or not there is a conscious intention to teach, knowledge of the material is necessary if it is to be communicated to others, and the process of transmission occurs only when the student incorporates the communicated knowledge into his folklore repertoire. Thus, “teaching” and “learning” are interdependent, the learning occurring as a result of reaching while the teaching can occur without necessarily producing learning. In other words, to be a performer of folklore one must have already learned the material from another person. On the other hand, one’s performance before an audience may “teach” none, some, or all of one’s knowledge to the spectators.

3. **The capacity to learn:** This capacity is the determining factor in cultural continuity; without it, transmission would not occur and folkloric material would die with the generation that possessed knowledge of it. The complicated process of learning has several forms, depending upon the nature of the material “learned,” the method used in “teaching,” or communicating, and the conditions under which transmission takes place.

Thus, as we have seen, social and cultural anthropologists have been partially successful in their application of learning theories to such problems of culture as cultural phenomena, cultural mechanisms, and the dynamics of culture. Folklorists, on the other hand, despite an early awareness of the influence of learning on *stability* and change in folklore, have not utilized learning principles, and consequently, their studies have derived minimal benefit from advances made in learning theory. Over the past fifty-five years, folklorists have attempted to devise their laws of stability and change in folklore tradition, employing fragments of learning concepts developed through common sense or isolated empirical facts (such as the “law of repetition”) and a terminology unrelated to learning theory designations (such as “affinity” and the “law of attraction”).

Moreover, folklorists have established a *negative* tradition of folklore scholarship. Considering only problems of change in the folk tradition, rather than pursuing the original positive studies initiated by Anderson and Aarne, they have left questions of stability and continuity unanswered.

## Learning

Although the meaning of the word “learning” seems clear enough, psychologists have noted that a precise comprehensive definition of it is difficult to achieve. A great many definitions have been proposed, but only a few are acceptable to all learning theorists; L. Postman noted,

- ... there is little disagreement among learning theorists about the classification of experimental facts as instances of learning. The disagreements center around the necessary and sufficient conditions of learning and interpretation of learning process ... The fact that the definition of learning has not been a major theoretical issue reflects a considerable amount of agreement on the *empirical* independent and dependent variables that define an experiment on learning [135].

Summing up learning theory, Hilgard concluded: “The controversy is over fact and interpretation, not over definition” [136].

## Independent and dependent variables

In experimental psychology, “variables” are defined as “Characteristics that can vary from one situation to another,” [137] and are divided into two major types: dependent and independent. A *dependent variable* is “... one about which we make a prediction” [138] and it “... changes in response to change in other [independent] variables” [139]. An *independent variable* is “... one we use to make the prediction” [140] and one “... whose changes are used to produce or predict changes in other [dependent] variables” [141].

Thus, when a folklorist attempts to establish principles of stability and change in oral transmission through experimentation each of the texts utilized in the experiment can be an independent variable, and the responses made by his subjects the dependent variables. Had Bartlett, Anderson, Wesselski, Ortutay, and Schier varied their texts (i.e., “The War of Ghosts,” used by Bartlett [142]; “the very best poem by Gellert or Hagendorn,” suggested for Schlegel’s hypothetical experiment [143]; “Dornröschen” [Sleeping Beauty], used by Wesselski [144]; and “Teufel als Mädchen” [Devil as Maiden] used by Anderson [145], Ortutay [146] and Schier [147]) each text would have been an independent variable among the “conditions” of these experiments. Unfortunately, these men did not change their texts from one experiment to another. The results they obtained are all dependent variables.

Other independent variables in folklore that should have been treated individually in these demonstration experiments can be accounted for in references to “good” or “bad” conditions. Thus Anderson’s statements, “the fundamental errors of the Bartlett experiment” [148] and “the stipulations of the experiment



were more acute” [149], and Schier’s “improvements” to avoid Anderson’s “five most serious sources of error” [150] are all references to factors which influenced the results of the experiments and are recognized by experimental psychologists as independent variables.

### Variables in experimental folklore scholarship

Altogether folklorists and the psychologist Bartlett have conducted six different demonstration experiments in which the basic issues treated as independent variables were: the structure, length, and impressiveness of the material; the social and cultural conditions of the subjects; the age of the subjects; the time lapse between the recitation of the material and its reproduction by the subjects; and the media used in the transmission of the material to and from the subjects.

- 1. Structure:** Structure was one of the presumed “independent variables” of Anderson’s 1951 demonstration experiment. Anderson recognized the relevance of the structure of the material to the process of learning and remembering: “for text[,] a ... simple ... legend was selected” [151].
- 2. Length:** Length was another presumed “independent variable” in the Anderson experiment of 1951. Anderson perceived the importance of this secondary structural feature to the process of learning and retention and wrote, “for text[,] a ... simple ... legend was selected” [152].
- 3. Impressiveness:** The impressiveness of the tale was a third presumed “independent variable” in Anderson’s 1951 demonstration experiment. Anderson noted that this relative psychological factor, differing from one culture to another, was important to the process of learning and retention, and stated that the “legend” was “very impressive” [153].
- 4. Subjects:** The social and cultural conditions of the subjects were one of the presumed “independent variables” of Bartlett’s demonstration experiment. This demonstration experiment was designed to establish the influence of social and cultural factors on the reproduction of a “... story ... [which] belonged to a level of culture and social environment exceedingly different from those of ... [the] subjects” [154]. Wesselski, Anderson, Ortutay, and Schier chose their “independent variables” on a basis differing from Bartlett’s.
- 5. Age:** The age of the subjects was a presumed “independent variable” of Anderson’s 1951 demonstration experiment. He observed that neither Wesselski’s nor Schier’s subjects were selected according to Von Sydow’s view that “... one should have strictly distinguished between active and passive bearers of traditions!” [155]. Dundes agreed with Anderson’s criticism, stating “Most children are strictly passive bearers as far as *Märchen* are concerned” [156].
- 6. Span (time):** Time, or “recency” was one of the presumed “independent variables” in both Bartlett’s

1920 demonstration experiments and Anderson’s 1951 demonstration experiment. In comparing the 1951 experiment in Kiel with the 1920’s experiments in Dorpat, Anderson wrote: “the time between listening and writing down was always only 24 hours (whereas in the Dorpat experiment always 3 days ...).” He found that the dependent variable (the result), was very different, for “... the occurring changes still were starker” [157].

Dundes also recognizes the importance of this “independent variable” in the transmission of folklore material: “The time element in particular is critical. Bartlett’s subjects had a half-hour interval between receiving and transmitting; Anderson’s interval was one day” [158].

- 7. Media:** The media used to transmit the material to and from the subjects was an “independent variable” in Schier’s demonstration experiment of 1955. Schier felt that one of the “five most serious sources of error” in Anderson’s experiment was that “The oral rendition is imparted through writing-fifty” [159]. Similarly, Dundes states, “Even non-folklorists know that there is a great difference between the conventions of writing and speaking. One does not write as one speaks, nor does one speak as one writes. Bartlett made quite a point of the amount of rationalization that was added to the test material ... Had the subjects reproduced the tale orally, there may or may not have been the same amount of rationalization” [160].

Had these experiments been conducted according to the psychological criteria for experimentation, all of the so-called “factors” would have been independent variables and the “results” dependent variables.

### Definition of learning

Learning is conceptualized as a “... *change in performance which occurs under the conditions of practice*” [161]. In 1945 Hilgard proposed a more detailed definition, describing learning as “... a process by which an activity originates or is changed through training procedures (whether in laboratory or the natural environment) as distinguished from changes by factors not attributable to training” [162].

- Hilgard rephrased his definition in 1956; stressing the negative aspects of learning which are absent in his 1948 definition: “Learning is the process by which an activity originates or is changed through reacting to an encountered situation, provided that the characteristics of the change in activity cannot be explained on the basis of native response tendencies, maturation, or temporary states of the organism (e.g., fatigue, drugs, etc.)” [162].

In 1963, Postman verified Hilgard’s 1945 interpretation, stating that “... few investigators are likely to object to the definition offered by Hilgard” [163]. This general agreement is possible because “learning” has been very loosely defined by theorists. Hill observed that “... psychologists use the term



“learning” more broadly than it is used in popular speech,” adding, “we can at least note certain phenomena to which the term is or is not applied” [164]. Miller and Dollard state that “Learning” is relevant to phenomena which “... range all the way from the simple, almost reflex, learning of a child to avoid a hot radiator to the complex processes of insight by which a scientist constructs a theory” [165].

Hill outlines the vast field of learned behavior: “In psychological usage, what is learned need not be ‘correct’ or adaptive (we learn bad habits as well as good); need not be conscious or deliberate.” Sometimes we consciously try to learn and practice folklore activities, as in the case of apprenticeship, while on other occasions we realize that we can recollect a legend, joke, or proverb heard casually sometime earlier, or that we can still perform a game, dance, or rites previously witnessed or practiced. We also “... need not involve any overt act (attitudes and emotions [i.e., affect] can be learned as well as knowledge and skills),” in our attitudes towards certain folklore activities. For example, members of a Christian community revere Christian saints (e.g., St. Patrick of Ireland), feel cheerful at the sight/(idea) of Santa Clause, and--like members of other communities--hate “villainy,” admire “heroism,” fear ghosts,” and are intolerant of “deception” within the communal circle. Skilled knowledge of folkloric activities can involve a wide range of pursuits: folk medicine and the efficacy of various saints in particular situations; the events of a folktale or sequence of verses in a folksong; the dramatic elements of successful performance (evoking audience participation, accenting certain parts, dramatic pauses); performing a physical activity, such as a folk dance or folk game; manufacturing a folk artifact, such as a basket, musical instrument or earthenware item. “Reactions as diverse as driving a car” or playing a folk game; “remembering a pleasant vacation” or a pleasant tale-telling session; “believing in democracy” or in the existence of ghosts or (monsters), and “disliking one’s boss,” or a boring minstrel, “all present the results of learning” [166].

Miller and Dollard concluded that concerning learning, “Throughout the whole range ... the same fundamental factors seem to be involved, ... These factors are: *drive, response, cue and reward*” [167]. Most learning theories include two [168] or more of these basic factors, with stress on a particular element or relationship between elements as the fundamental operant in the learning process [169].

## Causes of behavior

Studies in learning psychology commonly employ three terms to denote causes of behavior: stimulus, drive, and motivation. Although these terms may appear to be synonyms, they are not interchangeable; over the past fifty years, their meanings have altered so greatly that today each represents a particular aspect of behavior.

### Stimulus, drive, motivation

A *stimulus* is “Any energy change which excites a receptor [170],” or, more simply, “... anything a person can receive through

*one of his senses* [171],” while a *drive* is “an aroused state of an organism, which motivates action” [172]. A drive can be an extended stimulus, for any stimulus may become strong enough to act as a drive. While a stimulus is simply a state of excitement or arousal a drive is positively compelling. Miller and Dollard define drive as “... a strong stimulus which impels action” [173], and Kimball Young states that “... a drive is a strong stimulus resulting from disequilibrium in the organism which impels it to respond and react” [174]. In folkloric behavior, when a person observes “I *feel* like singing (telling a joke, or dancing),” he is reacting to a particular stimulus, and when this “feeling like” turns into the actual singing, telling the joke, or dancing, he is responding to a drive.

The term *motivation* is “exceedingly broad,” and its study being “... a search for the determinants (all determinants) of human and animal activity” [175]. However, the functional aspect of motivation (stimulus, drive, need) causes “deprivation,” “restlessness” [176] and a general state of “disequilibrium” [177].

### Social and biological motivation

Following the Hullian learning theory (see note. 53, above), Miller and Dollard distinguish between two classes of motivation: primary or innate, and secondary or acquired.

**First:** “While any stimulus may become strong enough to act as a drive, certain special classes of stimuli seem to be the primary basis for the greater proportion of motivation. These might be called the primary or innate drives. One of these is pain” [178].

**Second:** Man, being “active, purposeful, predictive, and capable of controlling his responses” [179], does not satisfy his primary needs as they originally appear but transforms them through “acquired” (cultural and social) factors into needs which are acceptable and satisfiable in the context of his society. Thus, he does not grab the first woman he sees to satisfy his sex drive, nor does he urinate wherever he may happen to be, the moment he feels the drive to relieve his bladder. Every primary drive is altered and practiced within the confines of cultural and social institutions. Thus, Miller and Dollard write:

- The importance of the innate drives is further obscured by social inhibitions [...]. The conditions of society tend, besides obscuring the role of primary drives, to emphasize certain secondary or acquired drives. These secondary drives are acquired on the basis of the primary drives, represent elaborations of them, and serve as a facade behind which the functions of the underlying innate drives are hidden [...].
- Such terms as pride, ambition, and rivalry point to another powerful core of acquired drives. These are probably related to the desire for approval, but are somewhat more generalized and have crystallized into the desire for institutionalized symbols of approval somewhat analogous in function to money [180].



Similarly, in her article “Are Basic Needs Ultimate?” Dorothy Lee writes:

- I believe it is value, not a series of needs, which is at the *basis* of human behavior. In my opinion ..., the motivation underlying Hopi behavior is *value*. To the Hopi, there is value in acting as a Hopi within a Hopi situation; there is satisfaction in the situation itself ... [181].

Early psychologists attempted to ascertain the power of the drive-force exerted by social and cultural situations on the individual under particular social and cultural circumstances (cues).

In 1941 Miller and Dollard suggested as *probable* the concept that social and cultural situations possess a drive-force similar to that of their underlying primary drives. This proposal has since become accepted as a fact, and in 1954 J.B. Rotter presented a psychological theory that classified social learning according to “six major needs”: “recognition-status, protection-dependency, dominance, independence, love-affection, and physical comfort” [182]. Of Rotter’s six major needs, only one - physical comfort - is purely innate, the other five being social and cultural. Later M. Horwitz demonstrated that some “needs” are generated by the social environment, and reported several experiments proving that the social situation is capable of creating motives. According to Cofer and Appley, Horwitz maintains that such social situations possess ... motives as paralleling, for the social or psychological case, such physiological motives or drives as hunger and thirst” [183]. L. Festinger states that “Just as hunger is motivating, cognitive dissonance is motivating. Cognitive dissonance will give rise to activity oriented to reducing or eliminating the dissonance. Successful reduction of dissonance is rewarding in the same sense that eating when one is hungry is rewarding” [184]. Muzafer Sherif proposed a classification for “social stimulus situations” using “... ‘stimulus situation’ as a generic term for factors which at a given time are external to the individual, the skin being the usual limit for externality” [186]. As Sherif suggested, “The conception of stimulus situations that has functional significance in social psychology deals with objects and situations in their contextual relationship” [187]. Thus, “The individual experiences and reacts to social objects, persons, groups, cultural items (furniture, tools, words, music, and so on) in terms of meaningful relations prevailing in the characteristic patterning of these stimulus agents.” This concept is not new to folklorists or cultural anthropologists, Malinowski having introduced it as “functionalism” two decades earlier

Finally, Cofer and Appley concluded their study of acquired motives with the statement:

- The hypotheses and findings we reviewed ... were developed to a large extent in the context of drive theory. This is to say that learned motive states, such as fear and anxiety, aggression, and dependency, have been conceived as logically equivalent in status, character, and function to such drives as hunger and thirst [188].

## Social motivation in marxist psychology

At the time that social motivation was slowly gaining recognition among social scientists in America, it had already become popular in Europe [189] and was particularly attractive to the Marxist social scientist, who “... conceives of the individual as a product of institutions, whereas the Freudian scheme considers institutions to be the product of individuals.” As a general rule, “The Marxist locates sources of motives in the social structure rather than the individual” [190]. Thus, the origins of folklore are to be found in social and cultural motivation rather than in individual psychological mechanisms and organic factors. Lindesmith and Strauss partly agreed with the Marxist view of social motivation, stating that “There is a certain amount of significance and truth in the idea that [social and cultural conditions] ... are important sources of motivation [191].” They conclude: “The Marxist theory is much too one-sided [192],” because it discards all individual psychological factors, and the “Freudian conception of motivation, which emphasizes unconscious wishes and desires, has serious weaknesses arising mainly from the fact that no theory about the content of the ‘unconscious’ can be proved because the unconscious is, by definition, virtually unknown.” [193]. As a rule, “... gross organic needs ordinarily do not lead to anything but random or restless behavior, and ... merely prepare the organism to respond when an appropriate situation appears and thus to learn rapidly” [194].

The theory of social drive is quite significant for the study of folklore. Assessing “National Folklore Theories, Dorson states that in Russia, “The association of folk tradition with the theme of social protest (which has social motivational function) is not to be shrugged off as simply propaganda.” The importance of social motivation is also reflected in American folklore; “Although labor folklore has received little attention in the United States, the pioneering collections ... reveal enough bitter resentment against harsh working conditions and selfish employers” [195].

## Malinowski’s need, drive and function

Although psychological terms for motivation were not used in folklore studies, Malinowski’s influence brought such concepts as the “derivation of cultural needs,” “basic needs and cultural responses,” and “the nature of derived needs” into usage among anthropologists and folklorists. It should be noted that Malinowski used the terms “need” [196] and “drive” synonymously.

- Need” as defined by Malinowski is “... the system of conditions in the human organism, in the cultural setting, and in the relation of both to the natural environment, which is sufficient and necessary for the survival of group and organism (196).

Under the direct influence of Miller [197] - an exponent of Hull’s learning theory - Malinowski developed his theory of needs. It states that there are basic, organic needs that create a state of distress within the organism. The organism must act to reduce the need, eliminate the drive, and restore



a state of equilibrium, according to the stimulus-response formula, “Habits ..., learned responses and the foundation, of organization ..., [are developed] to allow the basic need to be satisfied” [198]. According to Bidney, “Malinowski reinterpreted the concept of origin so as to eliminate any association with temporal historical sequences” [199]. Ralph Piddington, appraising this theory, states, “The specific contribution of the theory of needs, is that it emphasizes, at all levels, the biological determinants of cultural activities and so provides a principle of analysis and comparison of universal validity” [200]. This emphasis on biological determinism led to the interpretation of social and cultural institutions as extensions of primary, biological needs, and consequently, the drive-force of primary needs was attributed to social and cultural needs. Thus, Malinowski writes:

- The origins of science, religion, and magic are not to be found in some single idea, corporate belief, or particular superstition; nor yet, in a specific act of an individual or a group. By origins we mean the conditions, primeval and enduring, which determine the occurrence of culturally established response, the conditions which, limited by scientific determinism, define the nature of an act, device, custom, and institution. We mean the establishment of the primary biological need for such organized activities as the search for or production of food, the organization of mating and marriage, the building of houses, the production of clothing ...
- The search for origins thus becomes an analysis of cultural phenomena in relation, on the one hand, to man’s endowments, and on the other, to his relationship to the environment [201].

For Malinowski, “origin” is an analysis of biological and geographic needs (drives) and conditions, and the devices (responses) for their satisfaction: social and cultural institutions and conditions. The function of these devices is the *de facto* origin, for the original function and present function of an artifact is the same, time not influence function. Timeless, biological conditions are the only factors necessary to the invention (origin) of a social or cultural item: it is universal motivations or primary drives that produce the cultural responses.

Since function and origin are the same, and origin and needs are collateral, motivation, and function are inseparable. In a sense, functions *denote* drives as much as drives *determine* functions: this was the basic concept upon which Malinowski formulated his ethnological theory. His primary concern was the integration of parts into a culture. In his examination of Melanesian Culture, Malinowski attempted to show how deeply fairy tales, legends, sacred traditions, and myths affected native life, controlling the individual’s moral and social behavior. In *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922), *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (1926), and *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (1927), Malinowski presents his thesis and his collected evidence of the meaning and function, thus establishing the origins of various folklore genres. Malinowski noted that the native distinguishes between types of narratives, the time of

year when they are told, and their use. There are the *libogowo*, which “we would call tradition;” the *kukwanebu*, or “fairy tales,” recited for amusement at specific seasons; the *wosi* or “various songs;” the *vinavina*, or “ditties chanted at play or under other special circumstances;” the *negwa* or *yopa*, importing ‘the magical spells;’ and the *lili’u*, depicting “myth narratives deeply believed” [202]. Natives perceive these narrative forms in terms of needs (or drives), social, cultural and geographical conditions (cues), and functions (reward, or the reduction of the drive through satisfaction of need).

- Parsons points out that “... even on the basis of learning psychology alone, Malinowski takes up only the one idea of instrumental learning and altogether ignores the possible significance of contiguity learning and classical conditioning.” Parsons, “Malinowski and the Theory of Social Systems,” (203).

Malinowski’s theory of primary and secondary drives has repeatedly been attacked [203]. However, it should be pointed out that, despite his oversimplification, the theoretical core of his thesis is, generally, regarded as valid. Anthropologists and sociologists agree with Malinowski’s historical assumption. Concerning the early stages of human motivation, Talcott Parsons states: “There is no reason to doubt that the motivation of all secondary drives or derived needs goes back in the genetic history of the individual to the satisfaction of primary drives” [204]. Parsons maintains, however, that “... in mature individuals the ‘ultimate’ motive for any specific act of learned behaviour must be the continuing satisfaction of a specific primary drive is certainly not an established psychological doctrine” [205]. Although Malinowski attributed all social and cultural behavior to biological primary drives, he was unaware--(nor was Parsons; cf. *ante*, page 26, n. 62)--of the position of contemporary psychologists who maintain that social and cultural situations, *per se*, possess a drive-force equal to that of a primary drive. While Malinowski’s hypothesis that social and cultural institutions were established to satisfy “primary drives” has not been fully accepted, his concept of the social and cultural drives, *per se*, has been incorporated into the present psychological view: Social and cultural institutions *do* possess a drive-force equal to that of primary drives.

- The term “survival” was introduced by Edward Tylor in *Primitive Culture* (1871). He applied it to “... that great class of facts of processes, customs, opinions, and so forth which have been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which they had their original home.” (206a). Thus a survival exists on the principle of “force of habit” rather than on its function. Tylor’s concept of survival influenced folklore scholarship to the extent that Andrew Lang defined “folklore” as “... the study of survivals” in *Folklore Record*. Malinowski, on the other hand, postulated that survivals in the sense of functionless “cultural fossils” does not exist. “The real harm done by the concept of survival in anthropology consists in that it functions on the one hand as a spurious methodological device in the reconstruction of evolutionary series; and worse



than that, it is an effective means of short-circuiting observation in field-work.” (206b).

Folklorists and cultural and social anthropologists alike have adopted Malinowski's principle of functionalism, without necessarily accepting his biological interpretation. In psychological terms, "function" designates a complex operation with a fixed sequence of collateral phases. In contrast to a "survival" [206], a "functional" element implies a need that gives rise to a drive requiring satisfaction through a particular cultural or social device. Lee stresses the occurrence of behavior as a reaction to the state of deprivation and restlessness that accompanies a need; she writes, "I use the term *need* in a broad sense, to cover the stimulus-response phrasing of behavior" [207]. Thus "functionalism" simply designates the instrumentality of a certain item in reducing a drive through satisfying a particular need. In application, functionally oriented folklore studies are those that attempt to ascertain the motivations behind folkloric activities.

### Motivation and folkloric behavior

In folklore studies, motivation must be divided according to its function into two classes: the informant's motivation and the operant's motivation.

1. **The informant's motivation:** Most of the research on motivational factors in folklore studies has dealt with the problem of stimulating informants to yield their folkloric knowledge. Some folklorists feel that stumbling onto a motivated, willing informant is "... very much a matter of timing, chance, and circumstances" [208], while others believe that finding the proper informants is a matter of planning, motivating, and responding. Whatever the folklorist's orientation, he will find, even in the case of "transient collecting" [209], that the informant is motivated by external factors (other than the collector himself).

A motivational factor can be personal psychological gratification, as Sean O'Sullivan remarked in his observation that "The country people seem to realize instinctively that we (folklorists) are doing something important for them" [210]. Similarly, Dorson noted that "illiterate old Trefflé Largenesse sat idly on a porch fronting the main street in town, bursting with content and hungry for visitors" [211].

Monetary payments have been used as incentives to elicit cooperation, Vansina recognizes the difference between drives exerted by genuine, communal social and cultural forces and artificial stimuli created by the collector. Alteration of traditions which may occur "... so that the tradition should fulfill its social function is usually unintentional" [212] and thus are significant to our assessment of the actual value of the item in the society.

Drives created by the payment can lead to intentional distortion because of the informant's expectancy of reward and his eagerness to tell the collector material which will net him the greatest reward. To combat this tendency, Vansina cautions: "... the amount paid must be reckoned according to

the number of hours ... and never according to the quality" [213]; *Notes Queries on Anthropology* [214] and Piddington [215] offer the same advice.

A gift or non-material aid can present similar obstacles to collecting authentic information as a monetary payment. George Pullen Jackson stated that "collectors and people who want to give something have often to be very sly about it," and he has resorted to such schemes as carrying "... two or three bags of tobacco ... and [ask] the storyteller [to] relieve him by accepting just a little of it" [216]. Kenneth S. Goldstein divided the informant's motivation into "Psychological gratification," "material inducement," "non-financial assistance," and "liquor" [217], all of which have been utilized by collectors in the field. Although the psychological principle of stimulus-response (S-R) relationship was not recognized by these fieldworkers as the basic operative force in the collecting process, this principle accounts for the fieldwork phenomena.

2. **The operant's motivation:** The operant's motivation is his everyday behavior as a member of a community in his social and cultural milieu. The solar mythologists regarded folklore as a symbolic representation of (response to) heavenly phenomena, while "Another and rival group beheld in the records of folklore the surviving relics of savage customs and beliefs" [218]. Such early theories ignored the crucial roles of the individual, whose behavior is partially determined by folklore, and of society, whose values reflect folklore as a functional, dynamic class of responses.

Freud interpreted folklore phenomena as a product of the individual and a symbolic projection of the psyche. For Freud, such genres as myth, legends, fairy tales, and jokes were responses to the individual's psychological drives that were denied fulfillment in actual social life because of unfavorable social and cultural conditions (cues). Therefore, the psychological school ascribed the origin and occurrence of folkloric phenomena to wish-fulfillment drives. Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905), and (with Oppenheim) *Dreams in Folklore* (1909), as well as Abraham's *Dreams and Myths* (1913), Rank's *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (1909), and *Das Inzestmotiv in Dichtung und Sage* (1912), and, more recently, Warren J. Baker's "The Stereotyped Western Story" [219] (1955), Kenneth Munden's "A Contribution to the Psychological Understanding to the Origin of the Cowboy and His Myth" [220], (1958), and Boyer's "An Example of Legend Distortion ..." (1964) are studies examining folklore as a response formula to wish-fulfillment. Investigations of non-narrative folklore genres, such as Hedwig Keri's "Ancient Games and Popular Games: Psychological Essay" [221], J.L. Fischer and Marc J. Swartz's "Socio-psychological Aspects of Some Trukese and Ponapean Love Songs" [222] and Israel Zwerling's "The Favorite Jokes in Diagnostic and Therapeutic Interviewing" [223], are also based on the premise that folklore is essentially institutionalized response to psychological drives.

The reduction of folklore to purely psychological motivations has proved unsatisfactory for both folklorists and



anthropologists (see *ante*, page 4). While accepting the relevance of psychological drives, Malinowski and the functionalists introduced social and cultural drives as companion aspects of folklore also worthy of consideration. The functional school thus attributes the rise [and continued existence] of myth, legend, and other narrative folklore genres and beliefs in a given society to logical needs/(drives). Malinowski criticized the psychoanalysts for having "... come at last to teaching that the myth is a daydream of the race, and that we can only explain it by turning our backs upon nature, history, and culture, and diving deep into the dark pools of the subconscious ..." [224]. He and other functionalists viewed myth as a living reality; "... it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man ..." [225]. Accordingly, myth occurs as a response not merely to organic psychological drives but to social and cultural drives as well.

Following Malinowski's precepts, William Bascom ascribed four basic functions to folklore, encompassing psychological, social, and cultural "functions" (drives): "wish-fulfillment," (the only psychological drive in the Freudian tradition accepted by Malinowski), "validating culture," "education," and "social approval" [226]. All of these drives, except for the first, are socio-cultural drives. Studies of non-narrative folklore genres, such as, *Kru Proverbs* by Melville J. Herskovits and S. Tagbwe [227], *Jabo Proverbs from Liberia* by G. Herzog [228] and "The Role of Nigerian Proverbs in a Nigerian Judicial System" by John Messenger [229], as well as studies of folksong, such as "Folksongs as Regulators of Politics" by Betty Wang [230] and *American Folksongs of Protest* by John Greenway [231], interpret folklore along functionalist lines as a response to social and cultural drives (stimulus-response formula). Having asserted that "functions denote drives as much as drives determine functions," (see *ante*, page 36) it may be concluded that folklore activities occur as responses to social and cultural, as well as to purely psychological, drives.

## Cues and responses

Thus far, we have established the principle that social and cultural situations and objects *do* possess motivational forces as powerful and effective as those exerted by primary biological drives. We have also established the fact that primary drives are generally satisfied within the social and cultural contexts of society. However, the acquired or primary drive must be perceived by the organism if reactive behavior is to occur: "Without drives, either primary or acquired, *the organism does not behave and hence does not learn*" [232]. Thus, any sort of behavior - simple or complex, biological or cultural and social - occurs only as a response to a definite drive. To eat, drink, or sleep, or to sing, narrate a tale or dance; to learn and practice folklore material or to repress such material and deny knowledge of it; to believe in mythical and legendary figures and their powers or to disbelieve in their existence: all such activities are not haphazard occurrences, but are responses produced by motivation possessing drive-forces. Hill in *Learning* states that, for Hull as well as "... for Watson, Guthrie, Thorndike, and Miller, all behavior involves stimulus-response

connections. A response is never simply emitted; it is always a response *to* a stimulus" [233].

Responses and motivations (drives) are closely connected; David K. Berlo, a communication process specialist, states: "We can define the term *response* in terms of a *stimulus*. Given an individual who has perceived a stimulus, *a response is anything that the individual does as a result of perceiving this stimulus*. A response is a reaction of the individual organism to a stimulus, behavior that is elicited by a stimulus" [234]. Responses do not occur in *vacuo*, but within definite confines. A drive, whether original or acquired, impels the organism to respond to certain "cues," but "Before any given response to a specific cue can be rewarded and learned, this response must occur" [235].

A *cue* is defined by Drever as an "... often obscure, secondary stimulus, which functions as a guide to our response, by way either of perception or of action, to a situation, though it may not itself be discriminated [against]" [236]. In folkloric terms, a child feeling boredom is receiving a stimulus and, if this stimulus grows to a certain intensity, it will become a drive. The child will have to respond to this drive to restore his equilibrium and his response will be elicited by the cues that he perceives in his surroundings: a mother who can tell folktales, a father who is not supposed to tell folktales, a friend with whom he can play, a television or radio which can entertain; times of the day when he is expected to perform or avoid certain activities, and many other factors contribute to the child's decision of the response which he will make. Cues are always perceived in wholes and, as Kimball Young writes, "... are largely innately [i.e., covertly] determined and the response follows at once" [237].

Miller and Dollard report that cues and stimuli are very closely related, thus they write:

- In general, stimuli may vary quantitatively and qualitatively; any stimulus may be thought of as having a certain drive value, depending on its strength, and a certain cue value, depending on its distinctiveness ... Since drive and cue functions are two different aspects of the same thing, a stimulus, any given stimulus may possess ... an important amount of both functions [238].

Similarly, Kimball Young states:

- The term "cue" has been used by Hull and others to mean a stimulus that determines how the particular response will occur ... Since both drive and cue have their source in a stimulus, they have much in common. The cue value of a stimulus, however, arises in its *distinctiveness*, whereas that of the drive, lies in its *strength*. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, cues may serve as drives [239].

If a child is accustomed to having his mother tell him folktales at night the mere appearance of the mother at that time will serve as a stimulus for the child to ask for a tale, whereas the appearance of a policeman or milkman at the same time will not be a stimulus for a tale. In the earlier example of





the child who is bored, the mother's presence, in addition to the convenient time and place, will act as cues to determine the type of response he will make. In another instance, if a person feels the need to play music, his response will be limited by the instruments at hand, each of which serves as a cue determining the type of musical sounds he can produce; if there are no musical instruments available, his response may be limited to whistling. On the other hand, a person who can play a certain instrument will feel the drive to play the instrument if it happens to be in front of him.

The key to the role of stimuli, both primary (drives) and secondary (cues), is expressed by Sherif as follows:

- The individual experiences and reacts to social objects, persons, groups, and cultural items (furniture, tools, words, music, and so on) in terms of meaningful relations prevailing in the characteristic patterning of these stimulus agents [240].

Therefore, in a society where social distance is maintained between persons of different ages within a family, a child will not expect his father to tell him a folktale or to joke with him. Similarly, an individual cannot make use of an object unless he knows what it is used for, and a child stimulated by boredom cannot decide to watch television as a possible response unless he is aware of its function.

In the preceding example, the child's request for a folktale will serve as a stimulus to the person he approaches and if this stimulus is sufficiently strong (insistence, crying) it will become a drive, forcing the mother to react. The mother's response, in turn, is elicited by the cues surrounding her and the child. If she tells the child a folktale, her telling is a response to the stimulus of the child's request, and if she refuses, the refusal is a negative response elicited by adverse cues. The mother might, for example, feel that it was not the right time for telling tales (in some rural areas of Egypt it is believed that a folktale told to a child during the day will cause the money of the teller's father to rust), or she might consider her child too old to listen to folktales, or might feel that watching television or reading a book would be more profitable for him.

In short, as Whiting, Miller, and Dollard point out "The drive impels a person to respond. Cues determine when he will respond, where he will respond, and which response he will make [241]." Thus, the relationship between an individual and a folkloric activity is a "contextual relationship," where "Emphasis on the relationship of parts within patterned wholes becomes indispensable in the characterization of social-stimulus situations ..." [242]. The activity will be determined by every factor the operant can perceive: the status of the individuals involved, the nature of the folkloric activity involved, the time and place, and the nature of the objects involved.

### Social factors and perceiving cues: [Roles and norms]

These evaluations of individuals, objects, and activities can be summed up as the "norm" for the operant's group, and the

two basic social factors involved in the process of perceiving cues are: (1) the role of the individual, and (2) the norms of the group. Roles and *norms* are interdependent, roles being ascribed to certain individuals according to the social norms of the particular community.

The concept of *role* is defined by F.L. Bates as "A part of social position consisting of a more or less integrated or related sub-set of social norms which is distinguishable from other sets of norms forming the same position" [243]. Bates would describe the position of the head of a family as a composite of his role as provider, playmate, disciplinarian, spouse, and so on. J.W. Thibaut and H.H. Kelley agreeing with Bates, define role as "... the class of one or more norms that applies to a person's behavior about some specific external problem or a special class of responses," and conclude that it is "... apparent that even in the dyad each person may be in several different roles" [244]. Norman M. Brandburn emphasizes the function of *expectation* in the formation of roles: "A 'role' ... is a set of behavioral expectations associated with socially recognized positions such as 'mother,' 'friend,' ..." [245].

In terms of folkloric behavior, one of the mother's roles is to entertain the youngsters at night, thus keeping them out of adult activities; and the minstrel's role is to sing and perform for the community; it is the role of certain individuals to be the entertainers, of the group rather than other individuals because they belong to a special class of persons, entertainers. Thus, individuals *expect* particular types of behavior from *certain* persons, while the same type of behavior would not be expected from others. In certain cultures a child does not ask his mother to tell him a joke and a mother does not ask her child to tell her a *Märchen*, for this type of activity is not a prescribed aspect of their respective roles; and neither the child nor the mother would ask the father to perform a folk-dance for them at home although he might be the best performer in his own *shilla* (group, clique--see *post*, page 164) outside the home.

G. C. Homans defines *norms* as "... an idea in the mind of the members of a group, an idea that can be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or other men should do, ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances." The norm's importance to a group is stressed by the fact that "... any departure of real behavior from the norm is followed by some punishment" [246]. Norms possess a social force which dispenses punishment for deviant behavior and reward for compliant behavior. L. Festinger, S. Schachter and K. Back state that this social force is "... a uniform set of directions which the group induces on the forces which act on the members of the group" [247]. Thus, norms are both abstract ideas and social forces constituting "... a pressure existing between a norm-sender and a norm-receiver's behavior in a category of recurrent situations" [248].

Turning to norms as they are expressed in folkloric behavior, for example, the norms of an Upper Egyptian peasant community forbid a child to ask his mother to tell him a joke (especially an obscene one), and deviation will induce punishment. Similarly, a man is not permitted to tell *Märchen*,



for the group norms assign this type of activity to women, and his violation of this norm brings about punishment [249]. Every folkloric activity is perceived in terms of its value to the group and the communal norms; roles are assigned to those members who best fulfill the particular requirements of the various positions. The role of tales in influencing social activities where social distance is rigorously maintained among separate social groups, especially between men, and women, and children [249].

### Cues are covertly determined

Concerning folklore, cues are the social and cultural conditions that govern folkloric activities and determine folkloric responses. To an operant, every stimulus, (a cue being a secondary stimulus), contributes to the action or behavior which he will make in response to the drive (primary stimulus) motivating him to behave. For example, when a narrator is asked to tell a tale, he will consider the nature of the request, the person who made it, the relationship of this person to himself, the suitability of place and time, the audience, his own physical and mental fitness, and other factors perceivable at the moment of the primary stimulus for narrating. Cues are always perceived in meaningful wholes and "... are largely innately [i.e., covertly] determined and the response follows at once" [250].

### Cues and folkloric behavior

For the folklorist or social anthropologist, it is important to determine the presence or absence of social objects and forces functioning as cues and to assess their influence on the operant. However, since cues are covertly determined, their role in social behavior is sometimes difficult to observe at all, much less to determine. An individual who has mastered a good deal of social learning can perceive the stimuli successfully. Cues (secondary stimuli forces) play their role by controlling his social behavior according to the norms and values of his culture. Failure to recognize cues results in improper or inadequate behavior and leads to punishment for deviation. The importance of cues has gained attention in folklore studies in recent years. In 1959, Melville Jacobs criticized both Boas and the Finnish School for diminishing the field of "folklore" to the study of abstract texts rendered lifeless by severing them from their original social and cultural context [251]. He repeated this criticism in 1964, in his presentation of a theoretical pattern for oral literature in cultural anthropology:

- When Boas, that most assiduous collector of precisely recorded anthropological folklore, suggested somewhat weakly about 45 years ago that a folklore collection mirrored the life of a people who had expressed it, he meant only that ethnographic items of technology, economy, social organizations, and religion ...

Boas resembled others in leaving most features of content, style, and connected socio-cultural phenomena untouched by theory [252].

Commenting on Jacobs' statement, Dorson has written, "In Jacobs' view, both the Boasian and the Finnish schools have

reduced folklore study to an arid descriptivist and mechanical procedure" [253].

Melville J. and Frances S. Herskovits recognized the need for furnishing considerable additional information about the "given" norms and values of alien cultures. They state that their knowledge of such Dahomean cues as "... patterns of family life, economic structure, educational techniques; of aesthetic values, religious concepts, and ritual ... [and] of the political development" all "facilitated" their task in fieldwork [254].

Similarly, Jacobs realized the importance of social and cultural forces on folkloric activities. In *The Content and Style of an Oral Literature, Clackamas, Chinook Myths and Tales*; he sought to establish the role of these forces (i.e., cues, though he does not use the term or utilize learning theory) in understanding Clackamas narratives. Dorson has noted Jacob's contribution:

- The most recent and most energetic suggestions for an anthropological theory of folklore came from Jacobs ... He seeks an imaginative advance over the Boas type of literal text which renders the oral literature of tribal cultures so perplexing and distasteful to Western readers. In his presentation of Clackamas narratives, Jacobs enlarges upon the literal text to supply details of cultural reference and nuance understood by a Clackamas audience but entirely lost to a Western reader [255].

The issue involved in this controversy is the perception and interpretation of the cues (social and cultural forces) influencing folkloric behavior. These cues are correctly and successfully perceived by natives because of their social learning and are incorrectly and unsuccessfully perceived by Western observers coming from a different background of social learning. The resultant misunderstanding leads to subsequent misinterpretation of the folkloric responses.

### The concept of cues in folklore scholarship

Cues as a psychological factor relevant to the learning process and behavior have been ignored in the study of folklore, although the concept of cues as an operative factor having empirical effects has been discussed by several fieldworkers. Folklorists have long been aware of the influences of social and cultural conditions on the transmission of folklore (i.e., the capacities to teach, to incorporate material into forms transmissible through time and space, and to learn) and on the folklore genres themselves. Folklorists devised hypotheses, and theories concerning the social and cultural setting of folkloric activities from their fieldwork experiences and independent of psychological learning theory. These theories, nonetheless, have psychological significance.

Perhaps the most important analysis and discussion of the concept of cues (social and cultural conditions) is that offered by Dégh [256] in her development of the theory of the "opportunity for narration" in various communities and groups. Dégh is here developing Iouri Sokolov's suggestion



that the folktale satisfies a social need and is practiced only within a social group:

- The tale is essentially a social phenomenon. If one can chant a song for one's self, and independently of the milieu where one resides, the tale [is] to the contrary[;] the tale is said in loud voice, presupposes an audience for whom it is recited [257].

Along this line, Dégh writes as follows:

- The *Märchen* arises from a need experienced at a certain developmental stage in human society. It is the circumstances that engender a tale, that form its conception, its shape, and its narrative style; and as long as these circumstances persist, so will the *Märchen* [258].

There are three basic principles to the cues concept in Dégh's formula, and all of them have been examined by several folklorists:

**Principle 1:** A stimulus-response relationship exists between the individual and the *Märchen*; man feels the need for entertainment and *Märchen* emerges as a response to satisfy this need. This principle is not limited only to *Märchen* but applies to every other folklore genre which occurs as a response to stimuli. As postulated by Sokolov and Dégh, the inevitable emergence of the folktale in response to human needs at a particular phase of social and cultural development is a stimulus-cue-response formula.

This same stimulus-cue-response formula has been introduced into cultural studies independently of its psychological learning content and has been adopted by functionalists. William Bascom was the first to apply the functional approach, and hence the stimulus-response formula, to folklore scholarship. The principle that folklore is a response to social and cultural as well as psychological drives has long occupied fieldworkers, for if folklore is elicited by social and cultural motivations and conditions, it must reflect the traits of that milieu. Boas introduced this concept, independent of learning theory, as early as 1891 [259] and developed it further in *Tsimshian Mythology* [260] and *Kwakiutl Culture as Reflected in Mythology* [261]. After Boas, the concept evolved in the works of students such as Ruth Benedict, who concluded in her study *Zuni Mythology* [262] that tales tally with, and yet do not tally with" the culture. Herskovits defined the role of tales in society, stating that "A substantial body of folk-tales is more than the literary expression of a people. It is, in a very real sense, their ethnography which, if systematized by the student, gives a penetrating picture of their way of life" [263].

In their study, "Socio-psychological Aspects of Some Trukese and Ponapean Love Songs," [264] J.L. Fischer and Marc J. Schwartz explored the possibilities for content analysis and responses elicited by cues and concluded that the content of the songs is following the male-female relationship as provided and formed by the social forces in these two Micronesian subcultures. As Dorson points out, their study also discloses the

fact that "The psychological attitudes revealed in the songs are ... genuine and can be traced to anxiety-producing situations in the culture" [265]. In other words, Fischer and Schwartz, through their analysis of empirical phenomena, arrived at the same conclusion as psychological theory: songs are responses elicited by cultural and social cues to the psychological drive of anxiety.

Dégh classifies the "tale-telling communities" into three major groups: "migrant working communities outside the village," "village work communities," and "involuntary work communities, which last for a short duration" [266]. Tale-telling in all three groups follows a characteristic pattern: Presence of drive, convenience of cues leading to the traditional response of tale-telling (such as the presence of a narrator and an audience because "There is no such thing as solitary story-telling" [267] and being able to spare the time), and reward. Tale-telling is a rewarding response because it successfully reduces the drive for entertainment or wish fulfillment among these groups.

**Principle 2:** The conditions under which the *Märchen* exists and operates in a society determine two major facets of *Märchen* as a folklore genre.

**A.** It determines the relationship between the *Märchen* and the cues necessary for its elicitation as a response to certain motivations. W. Eberhard and Pertev N. Boratav confine *Märchen* activities to particular social classes, whose economic life limits the possibilities (cues) for entertainment (drive) and the folktale appears as the most convenient response. Eberhard and Boratav observe that "... *Märchen* are always told in circles of the middle classes or of the poor" [268]. Similarly, Wilhelm Wissner, in his introduction to *Plattdeutsche Volksmärchen*, states that "For the most part, the persons who narrated to me, belong overwhelmingly to the lowest strata of the population" [269].

Jan De Vries ascribed two separate "functions" to the *Märchen*: an original function as entertainment, and a wish-fulfillment function developing at a later stage. He postulated that

"The *Märchen* as a product of a singular culture-phase in aristocratic circles, has so characteristically come to be," and that it "... was able to maintain itself in its original function for only a short period," for it has acquired a different function with a change in stimuli. The *Märchen* now (1954) "... found the way easily to the lowly folk stratum[,] where it acquired an important role as a sort of wishful-poetry" [270]. In other words, *Märchen* as a folkloric phenomenon originally occurred in response to the entertainment drive under the cues provided by aristocratic society, but today it occurs as a response to the wish-fulfillment drive under the cues provided by the lower social classes.

The historical aspect of change in *Märchen*'s role in society is also stressed by the psychoanalyst Martin Grotjahn, who wrote:



- The folklore and fairy tales of yesterday take up where the mythology of the ancients left off. They are, as Freud said, the run-down mythology of former times. Today a new form has been found. It is represented by the movies, the funnies' or comic strips, and most recently by the new art of television, which is the latest stage in this progression [271].

Thus, although human motivation remains the same throughout the stages of social and cultural development, responses differ from age to age as the cues eliciting them change.

**B.** Cues also determine the form and structure of *Märchen*. This principle has been accepted both by theorists, such as Stith Thompson, and by fieldworkers, such as Eberhard, and Lord. Thompson attributes the development of the frame story to "Vagabonds [who] often use their narrative ability to secure food and lodging." Under such a drive and with convenient circumstances "One of the frequent tricks ... is to string out their stories to an inordinate length so that they will last till dinnertime or bedtime." Moreover, "Sometimes, indeed, the scheme of Scheherazade is successfully employed and the hearer left in suspense until the next day [272]."

Also, Eberhard noted the influence of the Moslem fasting month of *Ramadan* on minstrel tales in Turkey: "The structure of narration is influenced by its social function as an evening entertainment. The greatest logical length is the twenty-eight evenings of the Lenten month of Ramadan [273]." The identical influence of *Ramadan* as a cue is noticeable among the Moslems of Yugoslavia. Lord observed that "... the festival of Ramazan [was] ... a perfect circumstance for the singing of one song during the entire night," for "... men fast from sunrise to sunset and gather in coffee houses all night long to talk and listen to epic [274]."

**Principle 3:** The *Märchen* exists intact only as long as the favorable conditions exist, and if these conditions change corresponding aspects of *Märchen* will change accordingly.

As has been pointed out, a "cue" is a "... secondary stimulus, which functions as a guide to our responses" [275] and the term "... 'cue' has been used by Hull and others to mean a stimulus that determines how a particular response will occur" [276]. Thus, all social conditions could serve either as stimuli or cues to folkloric activities. The perception of the cue value of an object, person, or situation is not a fixed, mechanical process, but varies from one culture to another and, to a lesser extent, from one person to another within the same culture [277]. Sherif has analyzed the flexible nature of stimuli as follows:

- The conception of stimulus situation that has functional significance in social psychology deals with objects and situations in their contextual relationship. [...] relations among various items, even in simple judgment and perception, are as important as the component items themselves. The psychological significance of any item cannot be determined independently of others which constitute a functional system. [...] The individual

experiences and reacts to social objects, persons, groups, and cultural items (furniture, tools, words, music, and so on) in terms of meaningful relations prevailing in the characteristic patterning of these stimulus agents [278].

An engineer, for example, does not derive the same significance from a folktale as a five-year-old child, and similarly, in a peasant community, a long, complex epic does not have the same significance for a five-year-old child that it has for an adult. It follows that whenever the "terms" of these "meaningful relations between the individual and these social objects, groups, [or] cultural items" change, the type and nature of the stimuli-value and cue-value attached to them will also change. Thus, what was acceptable yesterday is rejected today, and those who were deemed respected and desired and had "status" in the community are regarded differently today. Change in attitude because of a change in stimulus-cue value accounts for the appearance and continuity, as well as the vanishing and discontinuity of folkloric activities.

### Changing cues and folkloric behavior

As Edward Sapir stated, "Every profound change in the flow of civilization, particularly every change in its economic basis, tends to bring about an unsettling and re-adjustment of cultural values [279]." Folklorists have noted that broad social trends (changes) have altered folkloric activities and phenomena so radically that entire genres vanish from folk life (as in the case of mythical "priestly and literary" traditions in Europe "which have long ceased to enjoy currency," [280]) or will decline, shrinking in geographical area or in the social group which employs them. Dégh ascribed the recession of folklore in West European countries to a historical phenomenon: "The powerful industrial development in West Europe raised the peasantry into the middle class at an early date, banishing folktales to the circles of small peasants, petty tradesmen, and children" [281]. That is, industrialization not only affected the quantity and quality of material production but also affected social relations, causing cues responsible for eliciting folkloric genres, such as folktales, to disappear. "With the gradual disappearance of collective jobs tales [became] confined more and more to the family circle," [282] where social conditions (cues) remained unchanged to eliciting tales as responses to the entertainment drive.

Correspondingly, wherever social conditions did not change, the entertainment drive continued to be satisfied through the traditional channels. "The powerful industrial development in West-Europe" forced the folktale's influence to recede to areas unaffected by industrialization," ... whereas in the economically backward countries of East-Europe tales were sustained till 1945 by the agricultural proletarians of the capitalist-landowner system whose manner of life was hardly different from that of the cotters and servants of the feudalism," [283] Lord reported the similar decline and retreat of the Yugoslavian epic tradition to areas where conditions still encouraged its elicitation as a convenient response:

- What we have been describing ... was in existence in Yugoslavia in the 1930s and to an extent still continues



... In the old days, the ruling class of Moslems celebrated the feast of Ramazan in its courts rather than in the Kafana. When the Turkish rule was overthrown, the celebration took place more commonly in the Kafana rather than in private Moslem homes [284].

Likewise, Eberhard noted that the Turkish tradition of minstrelsy "is close to its end" because of changes in the social milieu and that it continues only under traditional conditions [285].

Economic changes have not only affected the social structure of communities but have also altered the traditional roles of the individual, changing his norms and values as he ascends the social scale. Miller and Dollard, observing the function of alcohol in different social classes, state that "If an individual moves from one of these social classes to another, he must change his habits about the use of alcohol." For example, "If he moves into the lower-middle class from the lower

### Social and cultural forces and the process of learning: A concluding statement

In summary, social and cultural forces and learning are interdependent upon one another. Social and cultural forces provide the stimuli that drive the individual to behave, as well as the cues that determine the type of behavior elicited (folkloric response, scientific response). These forces also provide rewards and punishments for the responses, the amount being determined by the value of the reward or the punishment for the individual in his social and cultural milieu.

We have also seen that other laws of learning are determined by social and cultural forces. Whenever a folkloric response is elicited by these forces the principles of repetition and recency affect the learning process. On the other hand, when social and cultural forces are adverse to a folkloric response and the response vanishes for some time, the three processes of loss of learned responses (forgetting, extinction, and inhibition) [286] become pertinent. It will be remembered that forgetting is due to lack of recency and repetition, extinction due to lack of reward, and inhibition to punishment. If extinction and inhibition periods are long enough retention could be affected by forgetting (lack of use or maintenance).

Thus, since social and cultural forces provide: 1) the drive for folkloric behavior, 2) the cues eliciting folkloric responses, 3) the reward and punishment of the folkloric responses and value of models for folkloric behavior, and 4) norms for folkloric behavior - as well as such learning principles as ego-involvement, meaningfulness, recency, and repetition - it is apparent that these forces determine two facets (variables) of the learning process:

1. The material to be learned.
2. The process of learning, as well as the process of losing learned responses.

Whenever social and cultural forces change, the process of learning will change accordingly, thus stamping in new modes

of behavior and stamping out the old modes. This "change" in the process of learning is not a change like learning itself, but rather a change occurring in the cultural and social mechanisms which guide the learning process.

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- “In contrast to short-memory, long-term memory is thought of as a system or set of systems that stores memories with retention intervals up to entire lifetime of 70 or 80 years. ... One of the other defining feature of long-term



memory is its seeming ability to form and store new memories." (P. 5).

On defining Learning, Purdy states that

"Learning is a word that humans often use in daily conversation, and when it is, everyone seems to know what it means. Still learning is one of those common terms that most people would have difficulty defining precisely." (P. 7).

Meanwhile, on "Positive Reinforcement Situations, it Purdy states that:

In conditioning situations that involve positive reinforcement, responding is influenced most strongly by the characteristics of the reinforcer. Of particular importance here are the amount (or magnitude) of the reinforcement, the quality of the reinforcer, and the time that elapses between response and the presentation of the reinforcer." (p. 116).

Here, it may be noted that the term "reinforcers" in the laboratory are the "tale-tellers" in real life. As for "Negative Reinforcement Situations:

Escape Learning and Avoidance. Just as the magnitude of reinforcement affects performance in positive-reinforcement situations, so does the amount of reinforcement influence escape-learning performance. In escape-learning, the amount of reinforcement corresponds to the degree to which the aversive stimulation is reduced after a successful response. (p. 116).

Mot., U263\$, Memory diminished by time. Forgetting (what had been learned) due to passage of time.

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